Greece now finds itself at the center of an unseen geopolitical game between the United States and China, according to an analysis by the Atlantic Council.
The think tank warns that our country is evolving into a “new battlefield” of economic, technological, and strategic influence, with “dark shadows” spreading over National Security.
As the report notes, the growing Chinese presence in critical Greek infrastructure, such as the Port of Piraeus, is raising concerns about possible Beijing penetration into vital sectors of the state.
At the same time, the U.S.A. is intensifying pressure for Athens’ full alignment with NATO and the E.U.
A German analyst, commenting on the study’s findings, emphasizes that Greece could turn into a “key point of conflict of interests” in the Eastern Mediterranean, with all that this entails for stability and national sovereignty, while ultimately “he sees” the country ending up leaning toward the East.
Skepticism
Specifically, according to the Atlantic Council, over the past 20 years, Greece’s policy toward China has shifted from enthusiastic optimism to skepticism, a transformation reflecting broader transatlantic and European dynamics.
Bilateral relations deepened during the Greek debt crisis, when economic pressures reshaped Athens’ priorities in both fiscal and foreign policy.
Privatization programs imposed within the framework of the memoranda and guided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) paved the way for major Chinese investments, most notably the 2016 acquisition of the Port of Piraeus by the state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company Limited (COSCO).
This emblematic project of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) granted Beijing a strategic gateway into Europe.
Athens officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018 and the “17+1” format under Chinese leadership in 2019, marking a shift toward Beijing, which in some cases softened Greece’s support on issues such as human rights.
After signing major concession agreements and selling additional assets to Chinese companies, concerns grew in Athens and Brussels over the national and European implications for security.
These fears, combined with the shifting geopolitical reality, pushed Greece to redefine its policy and align more closely with its partners in the E.U. and NATO.
From Thucydides to the port of Piraeus
Greece established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1972, shortly after the latter’s admission to the United Nations.
In the 1980s, Athens strengthened its ties with Beijing both to secure political backing amid tensions with Turkey and to expand cooperation in shipbuilding and trade.
Bilateral trade between Greece and China was limited in the early 2000s, about $900 million in 2001, but rose dramatically in the following decades, especially after the global financial crisis, reaching nearly $8 billion by 2024.
However, this increase was accompanied by a sharp imbalance: Greek exports fell from over $1 billion in 2018 to just $450 million in 2024, while imports from China nearly doubled, from $4.2 billion to $7.5 billion, driving the trade deficit above $7 billion.
Greece’s exports to China represent about 0.9% of its total $53 billion exports in 2024, consisting mainly of minerals, agricultural products, and pharmaceuticals.
By contrast, imports from China are much more diversified, dominated by machinery, electronics, and industrial products.
China is now Greece’s second-largest trading partner, accounting for 8.5% of total imports valued at $90 billion.
In terms of investments, Greece has evolved into a key entry point for Chinese capital into Europe.
Between 2000 and 2024, total Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) reached about $5 billion, according to the Mercator Institute for China Studies, focused on infrastructure, energy, shipping, and telecommunications.
Other estimates are even higher: according to the China Global Investment Tracker, investments and construction contracts reached $9.7 billion in the period 2005–2025, highlighting Beijing’s footprint in the country.
Piraeus as the “head of the dragon”
The Port of Piraeus, the flagship of COSCO’s investments with total funding exceeding $600 million, forms the central point of China’s involvement in Europe and a key hub of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The importance of Piraeus to China reflects both Greece’s economic vulnerabilities and Beijing’s maritime ambitions.
The port’s strategic importance dates back to antiquity.
The modern Piraeus Port Authority was established in 1930 and expanded in the 1970s, remaining central to the nation’s maritime identity.
China’s involvement began in 2008, when COSCO secured a 35-year contract to operate two piers, despite strikes and public opposition.
After the debt crisis and the privatization measures, COSCO acquired 51% of the Piraeus Port Authority for $310 million, transforming the port into the “Head of the Dragon” of Chinese presence in Greece.
In 2021, it increased its stake to 67% with an additional $95 million investment.
With a 22-day shipping time from Shanghai, ten fewer than routes to Rotterdam or Hamburg, Piraeus has evolved into a strategic hub of the BRI.
Its significance is reinforced by Greece’s global maritime dominance: the Greek-owned fleet, the largest in the world, controls 21% of global and 60% of European shipping capacity, with nearly 5,000 ships worth $70 billion.
Greek shipowners transport about 60% of China’s exports.
COSCO’s investment has brought major benefits: container traffic increased from 1.5 million units in 2009 to 6.2 million in 2025, making Piraeus the largest transshipment hub in the Mediterranean.
Revenues turned from losses of $37 million in 2009 to profits exceeding $250 million in 2024, accompanied by job creation and local development.
However, COSCO’s ambitions have also faced obstacles.
In 2022, the Council of State annulled a $4.5 billion investment plan for a new passenger terminal due to failure in the environmental assessment, highlighting the tension between major foreign investments, national legislation, and security concerns.
This shift reflects Athens’ adoption of a more cautious stance toward Beijing and its alignment with the U.S.A. and the E.U. in tightening the scrutiny of strategic Chinese investments.
In May 2025, the Greek government passed its first structured Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Screening Law (Law 5202/2025), modeled on the German system and fully aligned with E.U. Regulation (EU) 2019/452.
“One belt, one road” (BRI)
Greece’s engagement with China deepened significantly in 2016, following Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ visit to Beijing.
After his meeting with President Xi Jinping, Greece drew closer to the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative (BRI) and the “16+1” cooperation framework, a platform through which China collaborated with sixteen Central and Eastern European countries.
Athens had already obtained observer status at the “16+1” Summit in Riga, along with the E.U., the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Austria, and Switzerland.
In May 2017, Tsipras attended the first “Belt and Road Forum,” marking Athens’ ambition to serve as a bridge between Europe and Asia.
Two years later, in April 2019, Greece officially joined the initiative, now renamed “17+1”, at the Dubrovnik Summit.
Regarding the BRI, Greece had already signed a Memorandum of Cooperation in August 2018, during the visit of then Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias to Beijing, becoming the first developed European country to officially join.
Athens stressed that cooperation would proceed “in respect of E.U. rules and procedures,” presenting the agreement as a development tool rather than a deviation. Later, Italy and Luxembourg followed with similar agreements.
High-level exchanges intensified in 2019: Tsipras visited Beijing again; President Prokopis Pavlopoulos attended the “Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations”; and in November, President Xi made an official visit to Athens, symbolizing the consolidation of Sino-Greek relations within the BRI framework.
Technology: Critical networks, critical choices
Over the past two decades, the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei has established a strong presence in the Greek telecommunications sector, supplying more than half of the country’s sensitive 4G networks.
This phenomenon mirrors a broader European trend, as Chinese companies provided over 50% of 4G RAN equipment in fifteen of the continent’s thirty-one countries.
Huawei’s rise in Greece is closely linked to the 2008 global financial crisis, when its competitive pricing allowed companies such as Wind Hellas to expand their network capacity.
Later, it participated in 5G projects in Athens, Trikala, and Kalamata, although the latter, conducted in cooperation with Vodafone and Luxoft, was suspended due to local opposition.
Although Huawei’s market share in consumer products dropped dramatically (from 25% in 2017 to just 2.5% by 2025) due to sanctions, supply chain disruptions, and changing consumer preferences, it remains strategically embedded in Greece’s network infrastructure.
However, China’s overall footprint in the Greek tech sector is relatively limited, partly because Greek regulators, in alignment with E.U. policy, have become more cautious toward Beijing’s involvement in critical technological infrastructures.
In 2020, the Hellenic Police procured twelve Chinese drones for border surveillance, but subsequent technological cooperation slowed down.
In February 2025, the Hellenic Data Protection Authority launched an investigation into the Chinese chatbot DeepSeek over possible privacy violations, reflecting broader European concerns over digital sovereignty.
Although Athens initially hesitated to join the Trump administration’s “Clean Network Initiative”, a U.S. effort to exclude Chinese technology from critical digital infrastructures, Greece officially joined in June 2020, demonstrating a careful balance between economic pragmatism and geopolitical calculation.
Cosmote, Greece’s largest mobile provider, chose Ericsson over Huawei for its 5G network rollout, while Chinese state enterprises have since been excluded from public tenders, though Huawei equipment continues to operate in segments of existing 4G networks.
Amid this shifting environment, Huawei seeks to diversify its presence in Greece.
In cooperation with Greek company Faria Renewables, it is developing energy storage projects up to 1 GWh, starting with a 49.9 MW / 134 MWh project financed by Attica Bank and integrated into the European program “Greece 2.0.”
The $30 million investment reflects Huawei’s attempt to align with European energy priorities, remaining active in Greece’s green transition.
In early 2025, the company also announced the creation of a logistics hub at the Port of Piraeus, underscoring its ambitions to expand supply chain and digital infrastructure across the Mediterranean.
Navigating China’s Mediterranean ambitions
Sino-Greek relations have gained strategic weight due to Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, primarily the Port of Piraeus.
Although COSCO’s participation aided Greece’s recovery after the crisis, it sparked concern in Washington and Brussels over strategic dependence and NATO security.
Chinese control over a major European port is widely viewed as a risk to supply chain resilience and allied naval operations.
Tensions peaked in January 2025, when the U.S. Department of Defense included COSCO on a list of companies allegedly linked to the Chinese military.
Although the list did not come with sanctions, it raised fears of self-sanctioning and heightened uncertainty during a period of turmoil in global maritime trade.
From a transatlantic perspective, Piraeus has become a symbol of strategic dependency risks, influencing the E.U.’s de-risking policies, NATO security discussions, and the broader great-power competition.
To counter Chinese influence, the U.S.A. and the E.U. backed the Alexandroupolis LNG Terminal, a $380 million project inaugurated in 2022 and largely financed by the E.U., as a strategic and political investment.
Linked to regional pipelines, the project boosts Europe’s energy resilience and consolidates NATO’s presence in Southeastern Europe.
Athens, for its part, strives to balance the attraction of Chinese capital with its commitments to the E.U. and NATO. It aligns with E.U. positions on cybersecurity, international maritime law, and human rights, avoiding any form of military cooperation with China that might disturb NATO.
Under Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Greece has strengthened its relations with the U.S.A. and the E.U., limiting Huawei’s role while maintaining pragmatic economic cooperation and high-level exchanges with Beijing.
Alignment of Greece with the E.U.
Over the past twenty years, Greece has evolved from an “outlier” in E.U. policy toward China into a careful partner in the European de-risking strategy.
Historically, Athens deviated from the E.U. line, blocking, for instance, in 2016, a joint statement on the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling against China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, as well as a 2017 U.N. resolution condemning human rights violations in China.
These moves reflected the close Athens–Beijing ties, further reinforced by Greece’s accession to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), its participation in the “17+1” format, and President Xi Jinping’s official visit in 2019.
Since 2020, however, Athens has adjusted its course. Growing geopolitical tension, Turkish aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean, the intensifying U.S.–China rivalry, and worsening E.U.–China relations, has strengthened Greece’s reliance on U.S. and NATO security guarantees.
Although Piraeus remains an emblematic BRI project, Chinese investments have declined as the Greek economy recovered and diversified its foreign capital sources. COSCO’s expansion attempts now face bureaucratic and local obstacles.
Reflecting this repositioning, Greece refused to host the “17+1” summit in 2022 and now avoids positions that would fracture the E.U.
Chinese state companies are increasingly excluded from public tenders, while under E.U. and U.S. pressure, the country has adopted a robust FDI screening mechanism and aligned itself with the de-risking agenda.
The most recent sign of this careful balance came in October 2024, when Greece abstained from voting on E.U. tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, a stance symbolizing its intent to support E.U. strategy without severing economic ties with Beijing.
Pragmatic stance for the time being
Greece has adopted a moderate and pragmatic stance toward China. It accepts the designation of China as a “systemic rival” of the European Union (E.U.), but avoids open confrontation, seeking to balance its transatlantic commitments with the economic benefits of cooperation with Beijing.
This balance is most vividly reflected in the Port of Piraeus, where COSCO’s investment stands both as a symbol of China’s presence in Greece and as a pillar of Beijing’s economic diplomacy.
Within the framework of the U.S. - China strategic rivalry, Greece remains firmly within the orbit of NATO and aligned with the United States on security matters, yet without perceiving China as an enemy.
Athens emphasizes maintaining a strong American presence in the Mediterranean, but avoids alienating Beijing, in order to safeguard critical national interests, such as shipping, tourism, and foreign investment.
In the Russia - Ukraine war, Greece has criticized Beijing’s stance, but in a measured way, adhering to E.U. sanctions and export controls. At the same time, it participates actively, but pragmatically, in European discussions on resilience, technological sovereignty, and investment screening.
Overall, Greece follows a middle path: firmly embedded in the European and NATO security architecture, yet cautious not to sacrifice the economic benefits of cooperation with China, concludes the Atlantic Council.
Greece will become an impoverished protectorate of China
On the other hand, Greece, like several Southeastern European countries, will continue to remain under increasing Chinese influence, despite steps toward rapprochement with the United States, as geopolitical shifts in the Black Sea region shape a new balance of power.
After the return of Crimea, the coasts of Azov, and, as expected, Odessa under Russian control, the strategic situation in the region is changing dramatically, opening a new chapter in the relations among Russia, Turkey, Europe, and China.
Russia, through the integration of these territories, has essentially regained strategic control of the Black Sea.
As the German political scientist Alexander Rahr notes, “there will no longer be a Ukrainian fleet in Odessa, and certainly no NATO bases.”
Russia is expected to share its influence in the Black Sea with Turkey, which, through the Montreux Convention, retains control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits and limits the presence of warships belonging to non-Black Sea states.
Russia-Turkey cooperation also extends to the energy sector.
The construction of the Turkish Stream pipeline, which supplies natural gas to Turkey and Europe, reinforces energy interdependence.
At the same time, Turkey actively participates in the Southern Gas Corridor (TANAP and TAP), diversifying energy flows and aiming to become a regional energy hub.
Europe, according to Rahr, “will gradually become part of Eurasia.”
Despite ongoing sanctions, its need for Russian natural gas via pipelines remains unavoidable, as confirmed by the full operation of the TurkStream.
Simultaneously, China is increasing its role in the region through the expansion of the “Silk Road” toward Europe via the Black Sea.
Countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Western Balkan states will become increasingly dependent on Chinese investments, while reducing their level of activity within NATO.
China has already expressed particular interest in the ports of Constanța in Romania and Varna in Bulgaria, which serve as key entry points into Central Europe.
After the anticipated liberation of Odessa, the strategic balance in the Black Sea will shift, leading the countries of the region to move in alignment with the major regional powers.
Greece and its neighbors will not determine their own destiny but will depend on the geopolitical decisions of Russia, Turkey, and China, while Europe will gradually find itself increasingly tied to the Eurasian continent.
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