Turkey of Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivers a critical blow to the IMEEC trade and energy corridor by excluding Israel, Cyprus and Greece and creating a serious trap for American interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
By hosting leaders of Hamas, restricting trade and air connections with Israel and carrying out high-risk military moves, Ankara is attempting to reshape routes for the transport of goods and energy while the United States risks becoming dependent on a single gate that Turkey can use as a geopolitical bargaining chip.
Turkey’s game targets not only the region but also the balance of power between the West and the East.
In particular, according to an article by analysts and Knesset members Ohad Tal and Alon Schuster in the Middle East Forum, recent plans for the next day in Gaza give Turkey no security or governance role. This assessment is logical. A state that hosts and legitimizes leaders of Hamas and finances their base in Gaza cannot stabilize borders. The same logic should guide U.S. policy regarding the India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC).
At the G20 Summit in 2023, the United States and its partners presented the IMEEC. Under this trade corridor, ships will transport goods and energy from India to ports in the Persian Gulf. Then the goods cross the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan by rail or road to the port of Haifa in Israel and from there to Europe via Cyprus and Greece. The IMEEC bypasses Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Russia, diversifies routes and reduces exposure to critical choke points.
Ankara understands the stakes. If the line follows the original route, trade and energy will pass through Israel, Cyprus and Greece instead of Turkey. Turkish leaders now promote competing land corridors, the Iraq – Turkey Development Road from al-Faw to Europe, and a concept connecting the Persian Gulf with Turkey through Syria and Jordan. Their purpose is to divert the flow of goods from the Israel – Cyprus – Greece axis and direct it through Turkey. If Washington accepts this shift, the United States will again depend on a single gate between the Persian Gulf and Europe. Instead of spreading risk over many partners, the United States will rely on a state that turns transit and defense agreements into bargaining cards against NATO and Washington.
Turkey’s record reinforces this concern. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey hosts leaders of Hamas, allows gatherings that praise Hamas and attack Israel, while restricting trade and air connections with Israel. At the same time, it pressures a U.S. ally while seeking a role in Gaza.
Military level
At the military level, Turkey purchased the Russian S-400 air-defense system, seeks new F-16 jets and upgrades, and continues to speak of a potential return to the F-35 program. Israel’s qualitative military edge is based on the F-35. The operation of the S-400 alongside Western stealth aircraft raises serious questions about the security of U.S. technology and the reliability of U.S. commitments to protect Israel’s advantage.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey disputes the maritime rights of Cyprus, Greece and Israel, and challenges the natural gas exploration in areas that these states consider their own zones. These actions discourage Western investment, disrupt the planning of pipelines and cables and undermine the Israel – Cyprus – Greece framework that the IMEEC needs for its European dimension, note Ohad Tal and Alon Schuster.
Timing matters. In 2026 and 2027, Greece and Cyprus will hold the rotating presidency of the European Union. Both have large commercial fleets and focus on maritime routes, naval law and energy security. If the IMEEC proceeds along the route India – Persian Gulf – Israel – Cyprus – Greece, Athens and Nicosia can use their role in the EU to solidify a policy that supports lawful maritime rights, accelerates energy and interconnection projects and aligns with U.S. efforts to balance China and Russia.
From the U.S. perspective, this alignment offers clear gains. A corridor led by the United States from India to Europe via partners who want it to function, combined with an EU agenda shaped by two of those partners. The benefit diminishes if the IMEEC is diverted through Syria and Turkey or if disputes undermine the Israel – Cyprus – Greece axis.
The goal is not to punish Turkey or reward Israel. It is to harmonize U.S. objectives with U.S. means. If the United States wants resilient, diversified corridors, it must build the IMEEC and the energy plans around partners who respect legal frameworks and act with the West. If it wants to protect Israel’s qualitative military edge as part of a wider structure that supports American power, decisions on advanced weapons for any country, including Turkey, must reflect that country’s behavior.
The United States manages a broad agenda with Turkey. Protecting American interests requires clarity, not rupture. With Gaza, the IMEEC and Eastern Mediterranean security, making Turkey the central solution could undermine U.S. goals. Keeping Turkish forces out of Gaza, advancing the IMEEC along the Israel – Cyprus – Greece route and linking the provision of advanced weapons to verifiable changes would serve U.S. interests today and in the future, conclude Ohad Tal and Alon Schuster.
Who they are
Ohad Tal is a Knesset member for the Religious Zionism Party and chairs the party’s parliamentary group. He chairs the Knesset Public Enterprises Committee and is a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. He co-chairs several parliamentary caucuses, including the Eastern Mediterranean Cooperation Caucus and the Israel Victory Caucus.
Alon Schuster is a Knesset member for the National Unity Party and a former Deputy Minister of Defense. He has served as Israel’s Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, and before entering national politics he was a long-time head of the Sha’ar HaNegev Regional Authority along the Gaza border. He co-chairs the Eastern Mediterranean Cooperation Caucus.
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