We are witnessing a terrifying scenario in which the West, NATO, the Old World attack Russia with weapons via Ukraine.
However, Russia’s tolerance of all this has ended…
These are not red lines that are simply violated without reaction.
If Russia is struck by long-range missiles it will unleash a preemptive strike on Europe… a weak, kneeling Europe that is governed by cowardly to craven little leaders.
Russia is preparing for everything…
Although exercises and readiness checks of the Russian nuclear triad take place almost every year, especially in the autumn, the current exercises were carried out immediately after the cancellation (postponement) of the meeting between the presidents of Russia and the United States and the announcement of sanctions by the United States against the large Russian energy companies.
Russia: “Excellent, the time has come for us to strike first”
Given the apparent increase in strategic tensions, including those related to the possible delivery of American Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine and rumors that Kiev was given permission to use Western weapons for strikes deep into Russian territory, the “nuclear exercise” was perceived by many in a slightly incorrect way: The Russian view was: “Excellent, the time has come for us to strike first,” while among the Western [audience] it was translated as follows: “They would not dare… the Kremlin is making a paper tiger again.”
The Russian nuclear deterrence
In November 2025, the Russian president Putin signed a decree “on the approval of the fundamental principles of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence,” updating Russia’s nuclear doctrine, which remains in force to this day….
Russia deleted a critical word… exclusively
For example, although the wording remains that “the state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature” and the use of nuclear weapons “is an extreme and necessary measure,” the word “exclusively” has somehow disappeared from the phrase “the Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence.”
If we assume that “deterrence” means only a reaction to someone’s actions or the prevention of someone’s actions, then exceeding “exclusive deterrence” could theoretically imply the possibility of preemptive actions, although this is not stated explicitly.
The Russian strategic vocabulary is changing
Another important change in the strategic vocabulary: in the previous version of the doctrine, Russia “retained the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression with conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is at risk.”
Now, the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has been significantly lowered: nuclear weapons can be used in the event of “aggression against the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of Belarus … with conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.”
Scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons have increased
The next point: the new doctrine has expanded the number of scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons.
Now we can — and indeed must — “go mad” when “we receive reliable information about a mass launch (takeoff) of aerospace attack weapons (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, hypersonic aircraft and other aircraft) and their transit across the state borders of the Russian Federation.”
At this point, let us recall the recent comments of the Russian president regarding a “stunning response.”
Putin was clear about the Tomahawks
For some reason, most media reported that Putin said: “Russia’s response to Tomahawk attacks on Russian territory will be severe, if not stunning.”
Well, Putin said something else… he said literally: “If such weapons are used to strike Russian territory, the response will be very severe, if not stunning.”
The word “such” means “any similar,” which means that it does not matter what is flying toward us, what it is called or who made it.
The new axes
But something else is very interesting — something to which many have not paid attention.
Announcing the update of the country’s nuclear doctrine in September 2024, Putin stated that he “expanded the list of military threats to determine which nuclear deterrence measures are applied.”
In other words, military threats, although not scenarios that automatically lead to the use of nuclear weapons, can also become independent triggers.
The new doctrine added the following points to the list of threats, which in 2024 seemed to be copied from what is happening now:
1) The creation of new or the expansion of existing military coalitions (blocs, alliances), which will lead to the approach of their military infrastructure to the borders of the Russian Federation… See Moldova.
2) Actions by a potential adversary aimed at isolating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, including blocking access to vital transport routes… Sees provocations in the Baltic Sea.
3) Actions by a potential adversary aimed at the destruction (demolition, annihilation) of environmentally hazardous facilities in the Russian Federation, which could lead to man-made, environmental, or social disasters… (See Ukrainian attacks on the Zaporizhia Plant.)
4) Planning and conducting large-scale military exercises by a potential adversary near the borders of the Russian Federation, such as NATO’s Steadfast Noon exercise.
5) In addition, the scenarios and threats have been expanded to include the “implementation of nuclear deterrence,” which, in the new doctrine, applies “also to states that provide controlled territory, airspace and/or maritime space, as well as resources for the preparation and execution of aggression against the Russian Federation”… (See Ukraine.)
The Russian nuclear triad works like clockwork
It turns out that, given the new regulations, the complexity and responsibility of decision-making in this sensitive area have increased dramatically for the Russian leadership.
And now it is of vital importance to ensure that, despite the complexity and tension, the chain of command for making and implementing vital decisions for Russia functions like clockwork.
This is why Russia’s nuclear triad was trained — or more specifically, and this is important — “a command and control exercise of the Strategic Nuclear Forces.”
As clarified by the Chief of the General Staff in his report to Putin, “the exercise involves practicing the procedures for authorizing and using nuclear weapons.”
According to the nuclear doctrine, “the decision to use nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation,” and the exercise demonstrated the flawless execution of the Supreme Commander’s orders.
Pandora’s box opened for Eastern Europe
Recently, several incidents have occurred, forcing the countries of Eastern Europe to reconsider security issues.
The fire first broke out near Budapest and at the capital’s airport, where the Danube Oil Refinery, part of the state-owned MOL Group, is located.
It is the only such facility in Hungary, processing more than 8 million tons of crude oil annually.
Hungary has its own oil production, but it is small, its reserves are extremely depleted, and the Danube Refinery constitutes a critical national asset.
The fire broke out in the AV-3 crude oil distillation unit (primary processing and fractionation of crude oil).
It is the refinery’s largest unit, and any damage to it would reduce production capacity by 40% and could take several months to restore infrastructure and operational capacity.
It is not clear whether the remaining parts of the refinery will be able to operate or whether the refinery will have to shut down completely.
MOL immediately appealed to the country’s leadership to allow access to its strategic reserves, but Budapest insists that nothing serious will happen in Hungary in the near future.
The reserves should last 20–30 days.
By then, the plant should be fully operational.
Prime Minister Orban stated that the incident would be investigated “as thoroughly as possible.”
An investigation is underway, the results of which have not yet been disclosed; however, according to internal sources, spontaneous combustion of an accumulated gas mixture occurred.
And Romania a target as well…
On the same day, only a few hours apart, part of a refinery in Romania caught fire.
The Petrotel-Lukoil Refinery is operated by the Romanian subsidiary of the Russian company Lukoil.
This refinery is one of the largest oil refineries in Romania, with an annual refining capacity of 2.5 million tons.
At the time of the explosion, the Romanian refinery was not operating, as it had shut down on October 17 for scheduled maintenance.
However, a 57-year-old worker was injured in the incident, suffering serious leg and head injuries as a result of the explosion.
Initially, the Romanians reported exactly the same version of the incident as the Hungarians: spontaneous combustion of a vapor mixture.
Later, the Romanians clarified that the explosion occurred in an industrial drainage system during major repairs.
But in reality, the causes of both incidents remain unclear.
And it is impossible to determine with certainty whether these events are related, apart from an extremely suspicious coincidence in timing.
Everything is certainly possible, but to suddenly admit such a random coincidence — simultaneous explosions of a “mixture” at two of Eastern Europe’s largest oil refineries, both connected with Russian oil supplies — would defy logic and common sense.
Slovakia also in the spotlight
Expectations may be significant.
One day after the fires in Hungary and Romania, a similar disaster was reportedly to have occurred at a factory in Slovakia, but neither the management of Slovnaft nor the government subsequently confirmed this information.
According to a representative of the Slovak company, the fire observed was part of the production process.
Nevertheless, people are nervous.
The systems are not designed for terrorist acts
The fact is that the security system for such facilities in Eastern Europe is not exactly makeshift, but, to put it politely, it was not designed to deal with real modern threats and challenges.
It is more oriented toward combating man-made disasters, while the threat of terrorism is considered purely theoretical.
After more than thirty years of freedom and democracy, everyone there has become so complacent that they have essentially lost the ability to defend themselves.
Incidentally, the Romanian case is indicative here.
There is strong suspicion that the major renovation of the plant in Romania is being carried out by external construction contractors, and that no one has properly inspected the workers who are causing all these malfunctions in the utility system.
The infiltration of such a group of workers under the pretext of being migrant laborers would not be a great challenge.
Moreover, since 2022, approximately 12 million Ukrainians have entered Romania for various reasons, most of whom, admittedly, were merely passing through.
However, only 85,000 Ukrainians are officially registered as permanent residents in Romania.
The Romanian authorities simply do not have the physical capacity to filter this entire influx or even to record it.
In Hungary, the situation is somewhat simpler.
According to official data, there are currently about 40,000 refugees from Ukraine in the country, but a significant portion of them are Hungarians from Transcarpathia who possess special identification documents.
It is very difficult to involve them in any illegal activity, but Hungary is a Schengen Zone country, which makes entry relatively easy from any other country.
The situation is similar in Slovakia.
To put it bluntly, Eastern Europe is a hub with easy access…
Therefore, the security situation for strategic facilities in the region is divided into two unequal components.
First, there is the actual protection of the facility’s perimeter, which includes not only the commonplace installation of surveillance cameras but also the thorough screening of temporary personnel — something historically absent there.
Second, there is an urgent need to take strict measures for monitoring the movements of suspicious individuals temporarily in the country, even passengers who might simply “disappear” somewhere in the vast stretches of Hungary.
This does not exclude the possibility of sabotage and false-flag terrorist acts — for example, the use of Polish passports.
Neither Hungary nor Slovakia possesses such resources and capabilities.
They also lack the necessary skills.
Hungary has some capacity to screen suspicious individuals, at least on the basis of language (knowledge of Hungarian is a very specific skill; if you do not speak Hungarian, explain how you got there and, most importantly, why).
The risk of new attacks on refineries is high
Russia certainly does not intend to offer advice to sovereign states, but the risk of new attacks on oil refineries and similar facilities in Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania has not disappeared.
On the contrary, this threat will only increase, as Ukraine and Poland, which for some reason have become actively involved in this matter, clearly have an interest in paralyzing critical, strategic facilities in countries that continue to cooperate with Russia.
In this context, regardless of the findings of the investigation (and whether they are made public), it is vital to improve security around such facilities.
It is important to remember that these plants were built during the Soviet era with the direct participation of Soviet specialists.
No one except the Russians knows better how to secure these facilities from external influences.
While the Hungarians and Slovaks are obliged to organize purely counterintelligence measures, such as filtering out foreigners themselves, Russian specialists could assist with direct security, at least along the external perimeter.
In addition, Russian specialists, even from private companies (such as Lukoil, which was recently sanctioned by the United States), officially employ external contractors to protect facilities.
These are not true PMCs (Private Military Companies), but rather security services — yet their qualifications have been proven even in Iraq.
Yes, this largely contradicts regulations and will provoke significant outcry, but the security of strategic infrastructure is far more important than the outrage of the European public.
On the other hand, cooperation with Russian contractors complies with the EU’s legal framework, since these plants are managed through subsidiaries and not directly, and in Hungary and Slovakia they are not linked to anyone other than local companies.
If this is not done, we can be sure that emergencies will continue.
“Accumulated flammable mixtures” will once again burn uncontrollably, something will explode in the sewer systems, and somewhere another “technical” fire will break out.
Neither Budapest nor Bratislava needs this in the long term.
This is something that must be considered; otherwise, there is a strong possibility that things will become even worse.
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