The British report Module 2, evaluating public policy during the COVID-19 health crisis, published on 21 November after its presentation, runs to 800 pages.
It conclude, rather predictably, that lockdowns should have been imposed earlier and more strictly.
Anyone who has paid attention to the terms under which the Committee was assembled and the selection of witnesses will hardly be surprised by such an outcome.
But even the most “fanatical” supporters of lockdowns may wonder why a committee had to cost over £200 million only to reach what looks like a pre-decided conclusion.
The report talks endlessly about evidence and certainties
And yet, what stands out most is the Committee’s reluctance to examine any research that actually analyzes the impact of lockdowns on mortality.
As a result, the study contains spectacular, and at the same time unjustifiable, errors.
Let’s look at the claim that the 2020 and 2021 lockdowns “undoubtedly saved lives.”
This claim is indefensible for anyone even slightly familiar with the relevant medical research.
One can argue that lockdowns prevented some COVID deaths in a very short-term sense, although there are studies challenging even this.
But other research published in high-profile scientific journals on overall mortality, including deaths caused by the lockdowns themselves, shows that the British lockdowns actually increased excess mortality.
Another large study, published in the respected journal Health Economics, also concludes that there is no evidence that lockdowns worldwide saved lives.
The report then claims that if England had entered lockdown one week earlier than 23 March, deaths during the first wave would have fallen by 48%, roughly 23,000 lives.
But the data does not support this claim in any way.
The most comprehensive meta-analysis of lockdowns (a re-examination of the research data) shows that, on average, they reduced COVID deaths by just over 3%, and that’s without accounting for non-COVID mortality caused by lockdown impacts.
The idea that one additional week of lockdown in England would have reduced deaths by nearly half is simply implausible.
And on the specific issue of timing, the Health Economics study is absolutely clear:
“We do not find that countries which implemented [lockdown measures] earlier had lower excess mortality.”
The Module 2 report also claims that by mid-March 2020, the government had “clear and compelling instructions” that exponential transmission would lead to “unacceptable” levels of death.
These warnings came from the models of Imperial College.
But the report fails to acknowledge that the same modelers also predicted unprecedented loss of life in Sweden if it refused lockdowns.
Sweden, which introduced certain voluntary measures but refused to impose lockdowns, ultimately recorded one of the lowest excess-mortality rates in Western Europe.
Even more concerning is the report’s refusal to confront well-documented data showing that transmission was not increasing exponentially before the lockdowns.
As shown by Professor Simon Wood, infections in England had already begun declining before each of the three national lockdowns.
At least the report acknowledges that lockdowns caused enormous harm.
But nowhere does it weigh these harms against the supposed benefits it insists upon.
This omission is unjustifiable.
There are already many cost-benefit studies by reputable economists published in respected scientific journals.
Their overwhelming conclusion is that the cost, from economic damage and educational loss to broken social relationships and psychological strain, far outweighs any possible benefits, even under assumptions favorable to the pro-lockdown side.

Canadian economist Douglas Allen goes so far as to conclude that the cost-benefit ratio is so catastrophic that “lockdown will go down as one of the greatest policy failures in peacetime in modern history.”
As a final flourish, the Module 2 report assures us that “the Committee does not advocate national lockdowns” immediately before implying that a stricter lockdown should have been imposed earlier, a contradiction so stark it borders on parody.
The report’s conclusions may not be surprising, but they are deeply discouraging.
They suggest not only that the establishment failed to learn anything from the disastrous lockdown experiment, but also that leaders remain determined to avoid responsibility for the economic, educational, and social destruction they caused.
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