8 reasons why the US and Israel cannot claim victory over Iran
Three weeks of war—instead of the four days Trump initially predicted—are completed today, March 20, in the Middle East, and the only safe conclusion to be drawn is that the US lacks a convincing answer as to how, with what result, and at what cost this military conflict will end. It is now evident that the military superiority undoubtedly held by the US and Israel does not signal the achievement of victory.
Furthermore, it is becoming clear that while their Alliance excels in flight numbers, ammunition accuracy, intelligence quality, infrastructure destruction capability, and defensive power, it simultaneously fails on a political level regarding the implementation of its set goals. The gap between the extensive use of fire and the inability to achieve a political result becomes more apparent every day. American officials are now speaking publicly about the need to prolong military operations to reach their objectives, while the parameter of a ground invasion has entered the equation. It is clear that the sophisticated war machines of the US and Israel have failed to bring Iran to its knees, which in turn is revealing weapons and missiles that impress even the massive military machine of China.
Unclear objectives
One of the difficulties the US and Israel face in converting military operations into a political victory is the discrepancy between military and political goals. A military objective is usually measurable: destruction of missile launchers, strikes on command networks, weakening of defenses, or degradation of industrial and naval capacity. However, a political goal is more complex: changing the adversary's behavior, imposing lasting deterrence, rebuilding credibility, or forcing the opponent to accept the invaders' desired order.
Reuters reported that there is no full agreement between Washington and Tel Aviv on defining the war's ultimate goal; Israel focuses primarily on eliminating the top tier of Iranian power, while America speaks of destroying the missile program, naval capability, and preventing nuclear progress. Despite believing they have reached these ostensible goals through assassinations and bombings, they have failed to build the profile of a "winner," which is quite remarkable. Alliance members do not even agree on the desired final outcome; thus, the illusion of military superiority cannot easily translate into political victory since it is unclear which achievement should serve as the basis for announcing a win.
The illusion of air superiority
The second reason is the inherent limitation of air power in wars of enforcement. The Brookings Institution and the US Air Force have repeatedly admitted that air power can cause destruction but does not necessarily break the opponent's political will within a predictable timeframe. Richard Haass explains that in the strategy of enforcement, the final initiative lies largely with the target: it is the attacker who decides whether to surrender or endure. Success in air operations does not depend on the volume of destruction, but on the precise combination of military pressure, a specific target, and an exit path. In Iran's case, despite heavy strikes, the political structure has not collapsed, and there are no signs of a rapid surrender.
Survival of the capability to react
The third factor is Iran’s retention of its reaction capability. Battlefield superiority approaches political victory only when the opponent is unable to respond effectively and impose a counter-cost. However, according to Reuters, Iran, despite heavy blows, still maintains the capacity for missile and drone attacks, as well as the ability to interfere with energy and shipping. Iran’s strategy is based on "endurance, energy interference, and war attrition." As long as this capability remains, the US and Israel cannot convince public opinion that their military superiority leads to greater security; alongside the bombings, they face attacks, shipping disruptions, and energy uncertainty. This disrupts the victory formula; as long as Iran can still punish the alliance, a premature announcement of victory remains unconvincing, fragile, and unreliable.
Cost of war and cost-benefit ratio
The fourth factor is the war economy. For America, this war is rapidly evolving into an economic, industrial, and political issue: according to an official estimate to Congress, the US spent approximately $5.6 billion on ammunition in the first two days alone, reaching at least $11.3 billion by day six. Newer reports show that by March 19, the direct cost of the war reached $12.7 billion, at a daily rate of $1–2 billion.
At the same time, the Pentagon has asked Congress for an additional budget of over $200 billion to continue the war, a figure indicating that the issue is not just ammunition supply, but a massive and growing financial commitment. Concurrently, concerns about the depletion of anti-aircraft and ammunition stocks are serious; the Associated Press reports an estimate that approximately 25% of THAAD system stocks used in Israel’s defense have been consumed. Consequently, what appears as an increased capacity for support and fire actually leads to a rapid depletion of stockpiles, a need for emergency funding, and pressure on the supply chain, leaving the US government without a convincing answer on the war's sustainability.
Narrative crisis: The White House has lost media control
The fifth factor is the narrative crisis. Political victory is not created solely on the battlefield; it must be reflected effectively in the media, the market, parliament, and public opinion. Trump is struggling to shape a war narrative, with gaps between White House claims and reality. Reuters reports that exiting the war is difficult for the US government, and there is intense internal competition regarding the war's end.
This means Washington has failed to create a coherent story to justify the conflict. What is the goal? Limited punishment? Regional balance change? Destruction of missile capability? Changing Iranian political behavior? When the story is unclear, the success of military operations, even on a large scale, does not translate into victory for the public in the US or the world.
Expansion of the battlefield to energy and global trade
The sixth factor is the expansion of the battlefield from the military to the energy and trade fronts. In limited wars, the invader usually tries to maintain control of the field; here, however, the attacks on South Pars and Iran’s retaliation against energy infrastructure have moved the war away from purely military logic.
The attack by Israel and Iran’s retaliation have increased energy prices and harmed global market stability. The US-Israel war with Iran is squeezing global businesses across all sectors, from raw materials to transport insurance. This political dimension is critical: instead of bringing security, the war has led to market instability and supply chain disruptions.
Energy boomerang and loss of field control
The seventh factor is the ground dimension and the inability to achieve even minimal territory seizure. Despite statements by Netanyahu and Trump about a possible need for ground participation, their tone reveals hidden fear and doubt. This option is extremely costly, uncertain, and politically dangerous. Without ground forces, they cannot achieve a decisive political result; with them, the war becomes much more expensive and uncontrollable.
Erosion of US deterrence power
The eighth factor is the erosion of deterrence due to the war's long duration. The first few days can shock, but if the war continues and the opponent reacts, the initial shock fades. Every additional day is seen as a sign of non-resolution and potential complication. Statements by American officials about sending more forces and a new phase of the war show that their intervention was not enough to achieve their political goal. Continuous escalation is essentially an admission of the failure of previous actions, creating a growing quagmire.
Crisis in establishing meaning and the end of unilateral hegemony
Beyond the military and strategic dimensions, the difficulty of converting the illusion of superiority into political victory has a social and polling dimension, decisive for the US and Israel. Political victory must be "believable" to public opinion. The US problem is a credibility crisis in this sphere. The Trump administration faces contradictions and gaps between claims and reality; it cannot create a success narrative, let alone a war exit plan. An Ipsos poll shows that only 37% of Americans support the war, while 59% oppose it, and only 7% support the deployment of ground forces.
A different interpretation
In Iran, the concept of victory and defeat is interpreted differently; Iranian public opinion does not measure by the same criteria as Washington or Tel Aviv. For the US, victory means a presented result with operational and propaganda indicators. For Iranian society, the criterion is the country's survival, the prevention of external imposition, endurance under pressure, and the enemy's inability to build a victory profile.
Thus, the extensive destruction caused by the US and Israel does not translate into victory for the Iranian public. Events on the streets and in the cities of Iran confirm this. In conclusion, the main difficulty for America and Israel is giving the strikes some "meaning." They can destroy targets, but converting destruction into a change in Iran’s behavior, regional stabilization, lower energy prices, and the restoration of US credibility is much harder and, in some cases, impossible. The US and Israel have acted at an operational level, but strategically, they have no convincing answer on how and at what final cost this war should end.
Iran's missiles impress China
At the same time, Iran's missiles are gaining impressions even in China. A Chinese expert stated that Iran's use of the Sejjil ballistic missile shows determination for retaliation. According to Tasnim, the Israeli military announced on March 16 that it had begun a new round of "large-scale attacks" against Iran's infrastructure in Tehran. Simultaneously, Iran continued its retaliation, using Sejjil ballistic missiles to strike Israeli targets. The use of the Sejjil by Iran differs from the country's previous missiles and raises questions about whether its technology is more advanced and if the increase in weapon power means the conflict is rising to a new level.
The Sejjil missile
According to Wei Dongshu, a military analyst for Chinese radio and television, the Sejjil is one of the top missiles in Iran's arsenal, characterized by three key features:
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Rapid reaction: The Sejjil uses solid fuel and does not require the time-consuming fueling process needed by liquid-fueled missiles. It can be prepared for launch in about 30 minutes and can be deployed mobilely. The launcher can quickly retreat, increasing its ability to avoid attacks from Israeli and US fighters and drones.
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Exceptional offensive power: The Sejjil can carry a one-ton warhead. In the final stage, it possesses high penetration capability, allowing it to bypass Israeli Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 air defense systems, effectively striking and destroying high-value ground targets.
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Accuracy: Due to the relatively high cost of the Sejjil, Iran likely uses complex electronic components in its production to ensure high accuracy against fixed-position targets.
Higher cost for the adversary
Wei Dongshu emphasized that the use of the Sejjil shows that Iran will not easily back down in its strategic struggle against its enemies. By deploying its most advanced missiles against the opponent's most important targets, Iran seeks to impose a higher cost on its adversary. Given the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, the strategic interaction between the US, Israel, and Iran remains critical, and the question of who will initiate a ceasefire remains central. The Chinese expert added that Iran shows no inclination for an easy compromise and is ready to launch stronger retaliation using more advanced missiles if air attacks by the United States and Israel continue.
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