For more than two decades, Brussels has systematically delayed the accession process for Balkan countries into the European Union. Washington and Beijing are capitalizing on this vacuum, asserting influence in the region through the lens of geopolitical competition. At the heart of this confrontation lie Serbia and Kosovo.
Serbia in waiting – and in ambivalence
Serbia has been an official candidate for accession since 2014; however, in the last four years, not a single new negotiating chapter has been opened. Belgrade appears troubled, acknowledging nonetheless that it maintains parallel relations with Moscow, Beijing, and Ankara without demonstrating a clear and exclusive commitment to the European path.
The status of Kosovo remains the pivotal point of contention. On one hand, Belgrade considers it a breakaway province, arguing that the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 violated international law. On the other hand, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 2010 ruled that the Declaration of Independence did not contravene the rules of international law.
The two sides trade accusations over the violation of commitments, while the debate regarding territorial integrity in Europe has been reignited. Serbia continues to view the 1999 NATO bombing, conducted without a UN Security Council mandate, as well as the 2008 recognition of Kosovo, as a dangerous and illegal precedent. Within the EU, there is frequent talk of respecting state borders and sovereignty, yet Belgrade feels that "double standards" are being applied to its own case.
China invests, the EU protests
While European processes stagnate, third-party actors are strengthening their position in the region. An emblematic example is the Budapest–Belgrade high-speed railway line, constructed with Chinese investments and expected to drastically reduce travel time. The connection between Belgrade and Novi Sad, the country’s second-largest city, will be reduced to about half an hour, changing the landscape of the labor market.
The European Commission has reportedly expressed dissatisfaction, arguing that Belgrade is not sufficiently supporting the European project for the Belgrade–Niš line, for which an investment grant of 600 million euros has been approved. On the Serbian side, however, reservations are expressed regarding the way the project was promoted, as it is perceived to primarily serve European transit needs. Despite Serbia’s free trade agreements with Russia and China—rather than the EU—approximately 60% of its foreign trade is directed toward Europe. More than 500 German companies operate in the country, a number exceeding any other foreign presence.
Between Moscow and Washington
Belgrade seeks to maintain neutrality, though this is becoming increasingly difficult. The Serbian government condemned the Russian military operation in Ukraine and supported its territorial integrity, but did not officially join the sanctions against Moscow. Relations with the Kremlin are considered critical, as Russia supports the Serbian position on territorial integrity regarding Kosovo.
At the same time, the United States recognized Kosovo on February 18, 2008, one day after its declaration of independence. Since then, Pristina has maintained close relations with Washington, viewing it as its primary strategic partner. In polls, a significant portion of Kosovo's population expresses a positive stance toward the US, attributing to it a decisive role in the secession from Serbia. Meanwhile, a Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo has been in force since 2016, even though countries like Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece do not recognize its independence.
A region under geopolitical compression
The Western Balkans remain trapped between an European Union that promises but delays, and extra-European powers that offer immediate projects, funding, and alternative alliances. At the same time, Turkey seeks an active role in both Serbia and Kosovo, reinforcing the multipolar character of the region.
As positions on the Kosovo issue remain immovable and the EU fails to formulate a clear strategy, the Balkan deadlock deepens. The Serbian leadership appears willing to seek compromises, but not to accept the definitive loss of territory. In Brussels, the conflict in eastern Ukraine is presented as an example to highlight the danger of border revisionism. However, this invocation, instead of bridging the gap, may further distance Belgrade from the European orbit.
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