The nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia is not just another routine energy contract.
It is an accord that touches simultaneously upon Gulf security, strategic competition with China and Russia, the future of Israel's relations with the Arab world, as well as the credibility of entire American nuclear non-proliferation policy.
With its formal submission to Congress, Donald Trump made the next institutional move.
At the same time, however, he maintains a condition that could make the agreement politically unworkable: Saudi Arabia will have to normalize relations with Israel and join the Abraham Accords.
Here lies the major contradiction.
Riyadh insists that any normalization requires a credible and clear pathway toward a Palestinian state.
The current Israeli leadership, with Benjamin Netanyahu at the forefront, rejects this prospect.
In other words, Trump is advancing an agreement to Congress whose implementation he has tied to a diplomatic condition that, under current circumstances, can hardly be met.
Former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Michael Ratney aptly described the problem: the link to normalization was essentially introduced at the last minute.
And this addition transformed an already sensitive nuclear agreement into a geopolitical minefield.
Trump wants both Riyadh and Tel Aviv
The White House move shows that Donald Trump is attempting to keep two doors open simultaneously.
Toward Riyadh, he sends the message that the deal is advancing institutionally and that the United States is ready to pave the way for a major Saudi civilian nuclear program.
Toward Tel Aviv, by contrast, he provides assurances that final implementation will not happen without the major political quid pro quo: Saudi recognition of Israel.
This balancing act may prove impossible.
Saudi Arabia does not treat normalization as a mere technical signature.
It links it directly to the Palestinian issue.
Israel, on the other hand, views with intense suspicion any prospect that would grant Riyadh uranium enrichment capabilities or know-how that, under different political circumstances, could acquire a military dimension.
Avigdor Lieberman was among those who warned that such an agreement could fuel a regional nuclear arms race, urging Israel to lobby Congress to stop it.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, for his part, insists that the United States will not enter into an agreement that creates a proliferation risk.
Yet the fundamental question remains: what exactly prevents a future Saudi Arabia from turning a civilian nuclear infrastructure into a strategic lever of pressure?
The major contradiction with Iran
The agreement becomes even more controversial because of American policy toward Iran.
Washington has presented Iranian uranium enrichment as a central threat to regional and international security.
At the same time, it appears ready to accept a framework for Saudi Arabia distinctly more flexible than what it demands from Tehran.
This is not a technicality concerning only nuclear policy experts.
It is a matter of credibility.
If the American position is that domestic enrichment creates an unacceptable risk when it comes to Iran, how can the same technology be considered manageable when it comes to an ally?
Four Democratic lawmakers highlighted precisely this contradiction: the United States is fighting Iran to curb its nuclear capabilities, while simultaneously negotiating terms with Saudi Arabia that could leave the door open to enrichment.
This weakens not only the American argument, but also any future effort to impose strict limits on Tehran through negotiations.
Concern is heightened further because Riyadh itself has left open the strategic dimension of the issue.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated in the past that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will seek to acquire one as well.
Hence, the discussion does not occur in a geopolitical vacuum.
It takes place in a region where nuclear technology, deterrence, and the balance of power are directly intertwined, and where any exception granted today could become a precedent for others tomorrow.
The «gold standard» left behind
The agreement provides for cooperation under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, namely the legal framework required for significant American nuclear cooperation with a third country. However, the Saudi model does not adopt the stricter safeguards that were applied in the US agreement with the United Arab Emirates in 2009.
Back then, Abu Dhabi accepted not only the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, which provides enhanced inspection and verification tools, but also a separate commitment that it would not pursue domestic uranium enrichment or the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.
This model was characterized as the «gold standard».
Saudi Arabia has not undertaken a corresponding permanent commitment.
The American side is examining technical safeguards, such as a «black box» approach where critical enrichment technology would be physically sealed and inaccessible to Saudi personnel. But critics insist that technical protection does not equate to a legal prohibition.
And here lies the crux: Donald Trump has stated that «there will be no enrichment», yet a political statement does not carry the same weight as a permanent, binding prohibition embedded in the agreement.
Why the US does not want to lose Saudi Arabia
Washington, in any case, has strong reasons not to leave the Saudi nuclear program to others.
Mohammed bin Salman's blueprint for the country's economic transformation envisions greater diversification of the energy mix.
Nuclear energy could meet part of domestic electricity consumption, freeing up more oil for export.
For American companies, the market is vast.
Developing nuclear infrastructure could translate into tens of billions of dollars in contracts, thousands of jobs, and a major role for enterprises such as Westinghouse.
There is also a broader strategic dimension.
Saudi Arabia is investing in advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals.
For the United States, closer ties with Riyadh are no longer just about oil and weapons.
They concern supply chains, technological primacy, and efforts to contain the influence of China.
The argument in Washington is simple: if the United States says «no», Saudi Arabia could turn to China or Russia.
And Riyadh has already demonstrated that it is not waiting exclusively for American approval, soliciting bids from Russian, Chinese, French, and South Korean companies for its initial reactors.
The country's nuclear ambition, therefore, does not depend solely on Washington.
The real dilemma for the United States is whether it wants to shape the program from within or watch other powers gain control.
Congress, the veto, and the coming battle
With the submission of the agreement, the congressional review period begins.
Unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted, the agreement can take effect without an affirmative vote.
Opposition is bipartisan, particularly regarding the issue of enrichment and safety guarantees.
However, opponents of the deal will need an overwhelming majority to override a potential presidential veto.
The paradox is that perhaps the biggest obstacle is not ultimately Congress, but the very condition set by Trump.
Benjamin Netanyahu would welcome historic Saudi normalization.
Riyadh, however, shows no willingness to offer it without a substantive shift on the Palestinian issue.
And the Israeli government shows no willingness to pay that price.
Thus, the agreement moves forward while simultaneously remaining tied hand and foot.
In the end, the nuclear deal will not be judged solely by whether it is commercially advantageous or technically secure.
It will be judged by which relationship the Trump administration deems more critical when its two strategic priorities clash openly: the alliance with Israel or the deeper strategic alignment of Saudi Arabia with the United States.
And that is the real nuclear test for Washington.
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