As November 10, 2026 approaches, a critical question lies at the center of American strategic thinking: how will Washington maintain its naval superiority when China has the ability to influence the very production of the submarines that constitute a core pillar of that power? The question is not theoretical. Geopolitical tension in the Middle East and the South China Sea constantly reminds us that maritime power remains a decisive factor in international politics. The control of sea lanes, protection of energy supplies, deterrence of rivals, and the ability to project military power globally continue to constitute core elements of the US strategic posture. And in this equation, submarines play a starring role. US President Donald Trump has prioritized the reconstruction of US naval power and the restoration of domestic shipbuilding capacity. His administration is attempting to strengthen the industrial base of the Navy, address chronic shipbuilding delays, and upgrade submarine production and maintenance capabilities. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has summarized this policy with the slogan "more ships, more submarines." However, there is a serious problem: the American effort depends on critical raw materials and components, the supply of which is largely under Chinese control.
The Chinese rare earths weapon
The production of modern submarines requires specialized materials and components, including high-performance rare earth magnets. These are materials used in the electric motors, actuators, and sensors of American submarines. A recent analysis by the US Naval Institute, in the Proceedings magazine, points out that the motors, actuation systems, and sensors of American submarines depend on high-performance magnets, primarily neodymium-iron-boron and samarium-cobalt. A significant portion of the supply chain for these materials passes through China. Herein lies the strategic dimension of Chinese control over rare earth exports. Beijing has demonstrated that its dominance over critical mineral raw materials and especially their processing can be turned into geopolitical pressure against the US. This is no longer an ordinary trade dispute. It concerns a country's ability to influence the defense and industrial production of its biggest military competitor.
How Chinese dominance was built
China did not create its export control system overnight. It built it gradually over a series of years, turning restrictions into a complex licensing system that gives it significant influence over global high-tech production, the defense industry, and the energy transition. In August 2023, Beijing introduced rules requiring companies to secure special licenses before exporting gallium and germanium. These two materials are critical for producing semiconductors, advanced electronics, and defense equipment. China produced about 94% of global low-purity primary gallium and 83% of refined germanium at the time, securing strong control over global supply. In December 2023, Beijing went a step further, banning the export of technologies used for the extraction, separation, and processing of rare earths. This move was particularly significant, as China's advantage lies not only in mineral reserves but primarily in its dominance over processing and refining technologies that turn raw materials into commercially viable products. In December 2024, China banned exports of gallium, germanium, antimony, and certain super-hard materials to the US. It was a clear escalation, as restrictions on critical raw materials turned into a tool of direct strategic confrontation with Washington. In April 2025, Beijing expanded restrictions to seven medium and heavy rare earths: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium, as well as corresponding permanent magnets. Exports were placed under a licensing regime, creating uncertainty and potential delays for industries dependent on these materials.
The October escalation and Beijing's extraterritorial power
In October 2025, China announced an even broader package of restrictions, extending control to additional rare earths and materials connected to battery production. Particularly important was the proposed extraterritorial provision: even a product manufactured outside China, provided it contains a small percentage of rare earth materials of Chinese origin, could potentially fall under the jurisdiction of the Chinese licensing system. In other words, Beijing attempted to extend its regulatory influence far beyond its borders, touching international supply chains. The consequences were immediate and widespread. Prices of certain critical rare earth oxides reportedly multiplied, while manufacturers in Europe and other regions faced growing difficulties in securing export licenses. The automotive industry found itself particularly exposed, as rare earths are essential for producing permanent magnets used in electric motors and a multitude of other industrial products. In 2025, Ford was forced to temporarily halt part of its production due to material supply shortages. The incident highlighted how easily a shortage of specialized raw materials can cause severe production disruptions. Even after an agreement was reached between China and the US, the problem did not disappear. Chinese exports remained lower than previous levels, while prices per ton increased significantly. Supply remained limited and costs high.
The "Busan truce" and the critical date of November 10
Next came what strategic analysts described as the "Busan truce." Following Donald Trump's meeting with Xi Jinping on October 30, 2025, in Busan, South Korea, Beijing announced it would suspend core elements of the export restriction package it had presented in October until November 10, 2026. Concurrently, China suspended special restrictions toward the US on gallium and germanium until November 27, 2026. There is, however, a critical difference between suspension and abolition. China did not abandon its export control system. It simply agreed to temporarily put on hold some of its most sweeping provisions. It also did not fully withdraw the licensing requirements imposed in April 2025 for the seven medium and heavy rare earths. This is the true strategic significance of the current conjuncture. The US secured a temporary breather, not a permanent solution. As November 10, 2026 approaches, Washington faces the prospect of Beijing either extending the suspension or allowing the return of the October restrictions. Similar uncertainty surrounds November 27, when the suspension of special export restrictions on gallium and germanium to the US expires. For the American government, therefore, the rare earths issue is not merely about securing raw materials for industry. It concerns whether the US can maintain the naval power that underpins its global strategic influence without remaining vulnerable to economic coercion from its main geopolitical competitor. China uses restrictions as one of its most important bargaining tools in trade talks with Washington.
From submarines to F-35s and Tomahawk missiles
The impacts are not limited to submarines. Chinese restrictions also affect other advanced defense systems, such as F-35 fighter jets, Tomahawk missiles, and Predator drones. All these weapon systems depend on strategic minerals controlled to a significant degree by China. According to estimates, a Virginia-class submarine requires about 9,200 pounds of rare earth materials, meaning about 4,600 kilograms. An F-35 fighter jet requires about 920 pounds, making a submarine's needs roughly tenfold. Other estimates calculate that a next-generation destroyer may need 4.5 tons of rare earths, while a nuclear-powered submarine needs about 1.5 tons.
Rare earths are considered irreplaceable for three main functions
First, they allow quiet propulsion. Permanent magnets used in electric motors deliver power with low noise levels. Neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets are the strongest commercially available permanent magnets and are integrated into critical military systems, such as F-35 fighters, nuclear submarine propulsion systems, radars, and precision missile guidance systems. Without neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium, which help maintain magnetic properties at high temperatures, systems lose performance. In the case of a submarine, performance degradation and increased noise can prove extremely dangerous. A noisy submarine is easier to detect and, in war conditions, much more vulnerable. Second, rare earths are essential for high-power magnets and advanced propulsion systems. Samarium-cobalt magnets withstand higher temperatures and are used in sonar systems, towed sensor arrays, and reactor coolant pumps. Third, they are critical for special alloys and metallurgical applications. As with F-35s, missiles, and drones, submarines do not depend solely on permanent magnets. They need special alloys, coatings, and metallurgical materials, where rare earths improve heat resistance, durability, and magnetic performance.
The American shipbuilding industry is already suffocating
The dependence on rare earths adds yet another problem to an American shipbuilding industry already facing severe difficulties. As the Eurasian Times has pointed out, the US builds about 1.1 to 1.3 submarines annually, a number much lower than Chinese industrial production, which is estimated at 6.5 to 9 new submarines per year. The problem is even more intense in deliveries to the US Navy. Despite the fact that the US Navy has funded the construction of two Virginia-class attack submarines and one Columbia-class ballistic nuclear submarine, it is not receiving them according to the original schedule. Deliveries are delayed by two to three years. In May, Admiral Daryl Caudle briefed Congress that the US Navy will not be in a position to receive at least two submarines annually before 2032. The situation causes intense concern, as about one-third of the American attack submarine fleet is either undergoing maintenance or waiting to undergo it. Concurrently, the Columbia-class submarine, intended to replace older Ohio-class submarines, is not expected to be launched before 2028.
China is closing in — The US maintains the lead, but is losing ground
The US Navy still possesses the largest fleet of nuclear-powered submarines in the world, with 71 active hulls, of which 51 to 53 are attack nuclear submarines and guided-missile submarines. However, China has now surpassed Russia and possesses the second largest fleet of nuclear-powered submarines globally. It is estimated to possess 9 to 12 attack nuclear submarines, such as the Type 093 and Shang-class Type 093A/093B variants, as well as six Jin-class ballistic nuclear submarines, type Type 094. Overall, according to the analysis, China possesses about 32 active nuclear submarines across its naval forces, operating primarily in the Indo-Pacific region. The most important element, however, is the production rate. China builds more than six new submarines every year, continuously reinforcing its naval power. The difference in production capacity becomes particularly important during a period when the US faces delays, shortages of specialized personnel, and supply chain problems.
Not just an American problem — Britain and Australia exposed
The crisis does not concern the US exclusively. The British Dreadnought nuclear ballistic submarine program, as well as the future Australian SSN-AUKUS nuclear attack submarine program, also depend on American supply chains for steel, propulsion systems, and magnets. This means Chinese restrictions can more broadly affect the Western defense industry and not just American production. A report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) warns that full Chinese control over critical supply chains could put at risk production valued at $6.5 trillion annually outside China, with the US and Europe accounting for nearly half of this activity. Japan, which has officially expressed concerns about the situation around Taiwan, also faced a serious problem. In January 2026, shipments of dysprosium and terbium from China to Japan stopped, causing impacts on Japanese automakers and defense industry enterprises.
The effort to break away from China and major obstacles
Washington is attempting to limit its dependence on China, but creating alternative supply chains requires time and major investments. The Pentagon is funding pilot rare earth processing programs in the US, including Mountain Pass Revival in California and Texas. Concurrently, it has signed a four-year, $96 million agreement with Australian rare earths producer Lynas Rare Earths to supply light and heavy rare earth oxides. The US, Japan, and Germany are also attempting to jointly break the Chinese monopoly on rare earth magnets. Companies USA Rare Earth, E-VAC (an American subsidiary in Germany), and Noveon Magnetics are leading the effort to create the first integrated domestic rare earth magnet production chain in the US, with a horizon of 2027. Japan, through Hitachi Metals/Proterial, and Germany, through Vacuumschmelze, also hold patents for magnets and plan to enter production. However, there is a serious paradox: even companies seeking to make their operations independent of China still depend heavily on Chinese metals and Chinese smelting and processing capacity. Furthermore, Beijing maintains the export ban on Chinese rare earth separation technologies, which are necessary to create alternative processing units. This means developing new technologies and facilities requires additional investments, know-how, and time. The IEA estimates that even after implementing announced investment plans, magnet production outside China will cover far less than 20% of demand outside China in 2035. Concurrently, new magnet production units need 18 to 24 months to complete the SUBSAFE certification process, which is necessary for using components in submarines.
Beijing can strike the US Navy without firing a single shot
The essence of China's strategy is that it does not necessarily need to defeat the US Navy in a direct naval battle to limit its power. It can leverage US dependence on Chinese-controlled industrial supply chains even before warships and submarines reach the sea. This is the real strategic problem for Washington: American naval superiority depends not only on the number of ships, weapon system technology, or crew operational readiness. It also depends on access to materials necessary for their construction. November 10, 2026, constitutes, therefore, a critical milestone. If China brings back restrictions, pressure on American defense and industrial supply chains may intensify. Beijing holds a powerful bargaining tool in its hands: the ability to slow down the production of the American military machine without needing to engage in military conflict. And this is perhaps the most concerning element for the US: the next major test of their naval power may not be fought at sea, but inside factories, mines, and supply chains.
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